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A PERSONAL MEMOIR OF PLAINTIFFS' CO-COUNSEL
IN KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1
CRAIG BARNESt
ABSTRACT
After the killing of both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy Jr. in 1968, an intense debate erupted in Denver over the issue of
school desegregation. In April of that year, Denver public school board
member Rachel Noel introduced to her board Resolution 1490, which
instructed the superintendent to develop "a comprehensive plan for the
integration of the Denver Public Schools. This resolution was passed by
the board in May 1968 and became the focal point of public hearings that
took place in the autumn of that year. In January 1969, Noel and her supporters then introduced three resolutions, numbered 1520, 1524, and
1531, that would initiate an integration program to become effective on
September 1, 1969. These three resolutions would require re-assignment
of a limited number of students in northeast Denver with the intent to
achieve racial integration in certain schools that had become increasingly
segregated in previous years.
Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 became the subject of intense debate during the spring of 1969 both in the meetings of the school board
and in the community at large. The debate was intensified by an election
campaign during that same period to fill two positions on the school
board. By May 16, 1969, all three resolutions had been adopted, but four
days later, on May 20, two new opponents of the integration plans were
elected to the board. The newly constituted board then rescinded all three
resolutions at its first meeting. The board's action of rescission became
the basis for the lawsuit filed by eight minority plaintiffs in midJune 1969 alleging intentional resegregation. Plaintiffs' case consisted
additionally of evidence of school boundaries, school constructions, discriminatory use of mobile units and bussing, and differing achievement
expectations based upon race. The case for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the intended resegregation was heard before federal district
Judge William Doyle in late July 1969. After five days of trial, Judge
Doyle granted the motion for preliminary injunction halting the enforcement of the May 20 rescission. Defendant school district next sought a
stay from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which issued
t
Co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Keyes v. School District No. 1, as well as an author, playwright, radio talk show host, and founder of WeArePeopleHere! Stanford University, B.A., Political
Science, 1958; M.A., International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1959; Stanford Law School, J.D., 1962.

1059

1060

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:5

an interim suspension of the preliminary injunction, instructing Judge
Doyle to take into consideration the Civil Rights Act of 1965. After a
second hearing, Judge Doyle affirmed his earlier order, and the case was
taken a second time to the Tenth Circuit. Midweek in the last week preceding schools' opening, this court reversed, again staying Judge Doyle's
order. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to vacate this stay in the United
States Supreme Court, where on Friday preceding the Monday of
schools' opening, Justice Brennan reversed again, reinstating Denver's
integration plan.
The following year, following a three-week trial on the merits,
Judge Doyle again held for plaintiffs, setting the stage for a second round
of appeals, eventually leading again to the United States Supreme Court.
The case had additional consequences in the civic history of Denver
when the outcome of two subsequent Denver elections was determined
by association of potentially winning candidates with the Keyes case.
The ultimate success of the Keyes case in raising academic
achievement or long-term school desegregation may today be questioned. The triumph, however, of these plaintiffs, at this time in the nation's history, in a school district outside the South, and through the
courts rather than the streets, was of powerful symbolic significance.
Keyes demonstrated the possibility of success through constitutional processes for people who had come to believe that such processes would
never work for them. This was, therefore, a victory for democracy.
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I. THE BUILD-UP: 1968-1969
Things are forgotten in the course of forty years, names of key players, case citations, critical statistics, someone's crowning crossexamination. What I do not forget is how Judge Doyle sensed my inexperience and midway through my second witness threw his hand to his
forehead and exclaimed to opposing counsel, "Oh, Brother. Do you object to that question?"
We forget some things, but I don't forget that.
"It t'ain't fair" was our motto, handwritten on a sign by George
Bardwell, our statistician. George put that sign over our war room door.
We had to do this thing, he said, because it wasn't fair to have black students' performance treated as acceptable when only performing in the
eighteenth percentile while whites in other schools were urged to perform in the seventieth or eightieth percentile. It wasn't fair to excuse
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children of color because, as Denver Public Schools had written in its
reports words to the effect that "the eighteenth percentile is as good as
can be expected from these children in these conditions." It wasn't fair to
treat race as a tracer for poverty and equate poverty to ineptitude, or to
set expectations so low that they became self-fulfilling. It wasn't fair to
bus blacks forty-five minutes from northeast to southwest Denver and at
the same time to support white parents who bitterly resisted any bussing
of their own. Most significantly, it wasn't fair to move school boundaries
east across the northern tier of the city tracking black migration as it also
moved across that part of the city, consistently having the effect of returning black children into predominantly segregated schools, taking
them out of white schools.
Briefs and motions, pleadings, and appeals completely filled four
filing drawers in the first three months of the summer of 1969. Added to
these were the multiple rolled maps of the city and the school district
boundaries, all stored in the war room, and to these were added the multiple boxes of computer printouts with census data from the 1930s forward. The Keyes case consumed a lot of paper.
The year before the trial, in April 1968, I was sitting as a junior associate in my office at Holland & Hart and heard the awful news that
Martin Luther King Jr. had been murdered. The country had been
through several burning years, and the Vietnam War was spawning
widespread chaos. Anti-war sit-ins and street fires had erupted in cities
all over the country. With Dr. King's shooting, whole blocks were set
afire in Washington, D.C.,' and a candlelight march took place in Denver. That spring, a certain madness was in the air.
A group that named itself Citizens for One Community (COC)
emerged and organized large gatherings to consider whether, in honor of
Dr. King, something could be done about Denver's racially divided
schools. Leaders of that organization went from meeting to meeting trying to teach liberal Denver how to react nonviolently. We all thought that
something historic was going on, not only in the rest of the country, but
also in Denver.
In June 1968, Bobby Kennedy was killed. The country descended
into a rage about how both he and Martin Luther King Jr. could be taken
away, killing not only the individuals but also great dreams. Then came
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in the summer of 1968;
a travesty of rage and reaction, riots in the streets, protestors thrown
through plate-glass windows, and fires and crowds storming toward the
convention center. 2 Hubert Humphrey was nominated and among those
1. WidespreadDisorders:Racial Clashes in Several Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at 1.
2. R.W. Apple, Jr., Daley Defends his Police; Criticism Angers Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30,1968, at 1.
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of us who had been ignited by Dr. King and Robert Kennedy, despair
hung heavy in the air.
Spurred by this national upheaval, in the autumn of 1968 a small
group of lawyers with whom I was involved began organizing gatherings
to interview potential candidates for the upcoming Denver Public
Schools board election. We would seek someone who would vote for
integration. Elections were to be held in eight months, in May 1969. As
we found out, not everyone thought it a high honor to be considered. A
campaign for integration could very well be political suicide.
During this same period, the COC attempted to persuade the existing school board to make a decision reversing the increasing pattern of
segregation in Denver's schools. The COC urged passage of plans that
would implement the Noel Resolution of the preceding May 1968. In
January 1969, these plans were offered in three resolutions numbered
1520, 1524, and 1531. Rachel Noel, a black member of the school board
and a woman of extraordinary grace and dignity, was the leader in the
effort, and the resolutions were considered sequentially from January
through May 1969. Noel was joined in support of these resolutions by
two other board members, but passage would require a fourth. A huge
campaign was mounted by the COC. The school board scheduled weekly
meetings in high schools in various parts of town.
The city was desperately divided. As black consciousness was rising all over the nation, so too was there an increasing demand that the
school board recognize Hispanic culture. The Latino population of Denver was not as interested in school integration as it was in equal financial
and curriculum support, including especially greater recognition that
Spanish settlers had been in the State of Colorado for hundreds of years,
much longer than most Anglos. A group that identified itself as La Raza
Unida erupted out of the west side of Denver demanding reform. But La
Raza did not want integration reform. It wanted more independence and,
if possible, more separation rather than less. La Raza's leader, militant
Hispanic Corky Gonzales, led his supporters to those schools where the
school board was holding hearings. When Gonzales spoke, he marched
to the podium with a cluster of bodyguards. He demanded to know how
the board intended to correct the abuses of history. One particular night
at South High School, the members of the board majority were so insulted, and probably frightened, that they left the stage, simply walking out
of the meeting. Gonzales was left standing at the podium surrounded by
bodyguards, all of them facing outward, stony-faced, and glaring at an
audience of mostly Anglos. Only one board member, James Voorhees,
did not leave the stage. With his back to Voorhees, Gonzales made a
passionate speech to the packed auditorium. The speech crackled with
threats and tension. When it was over, only a few Anglos went out into
the parking lot. The rest waited until Gonzales was long gone.
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Pressure mounted on school board member James Voorhees to vote
yes on the resolution. Through January, February, and March 1969, the
emotionally charged hearings in the schools continued. Simultaneously,
the small group of lawyers that had been looking for candidates for the
May board elections settled on two: Monte Pascoe and Edgar Benton.
Each agreed, in effect, to risk promising political careers to come out in
favor of the integration resolutions. If they lost this election, they would
not be likely to have political futures, either one of them.
During the course of the spring of 1969, board member James
Voorhees became convinced to vote for the three resolutions that integrated a small cluster of Denver's schools in the northeast part of the
city. On May 16, the last of the three integrating resolutions was passed,
with Voorhees' support. That night, there was joy amongst a small group
of black and white friends who gathered to sing and dance under the cottonwoods in Park Hill. But there was horror in the rest of town.
On May 20, the school board elections were held and the integration
candidates Pascoe and Benton were defeated by a 2-1 margin. Pascoe
and Benton had become sacrificial lambs.
The new school board had its first meeting three weeks later. The
boardroom was filled to overflowing; a crowd had gathered as if to attend a public execution. The newly elected members repealed Resolution 1520, 1524, and 1531 with dispatch.
By this time, I had left Holland & Hart and decided to go back to
school to work toward a Ph.D. in international relations. It was
June 1969; I was preparing to study for my oral examinations at the
Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. For
appearances sake and to keep my spirits up, I had maintained a one-room
law office near the university. The morning after the school board repealed the integration resolutions, Bob Connery, another Holland & Hart
lawyer, called my office. He had been doing legal research for many
months on the possibility of a lawsuit that could be brought against the
school board for intentional segregation. Through the course of the year,
Bob remembers that he had been a strong advocate of litigation. My recollection is that his advocacy had been met by others with measured interest and considerable skepticism. Bob would say, "Well, there is this
case in Pasadena and this one in White Plains. You know, maybe we
could win this thing." Now, after the rescission of the resolutions, the
case should be much stronger, and other lawyers with whom he was
meeting, he said, were in agreement.
Connery asked if I would work with these others on a draft complaint to sue the school board of School District Number I on behalf of
all those children in Denver who were being denied an equal educational
opportunity. He asked me to work on the case over the weekend. It might
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be as short as that. On the other hand, if I were to participate in the trial
itself, it might be longer.
I was flattered, but when I had been at Holland & Hart, I had had
practically no trial experience and was then preparing for orals in international relations. Nevertheless, the case was huge, and I agreed. Connery promised that he was talking to another, more senior trial lawyer,
Gordon Greiner, also at Holland & Hart. So that is how, for some of us
on the plaintiffs' side, the Keyes case began.
II. TH-E FIRST ROUNDS INCOURT: MAY-AUGUST1969
Shortly after my conversation with Connery, University of Denver
statistics Professor George Bardwell called my office. In anticipation of
some action, he and Dr. Paul Klite had been gathering facts for months
and probably knew as much about classroom statistics and distribution of
students by race as did the school administration itself. Bardwell offered
to help with the case. Bardwell, Klite, and I met immediately. Bardwell
had collected census data from as far back as the 1930s. He also knew
where the school district boundary maps could be located and speculated
about a possible connection between movements of the black population
and changes in school boundaries.
There was other suggestive evidence. Manual High School in the
northern, black part of town had been opened for manual arts in the
1920s but not for college preparation. Because only blacks lived in the
area, the decision to open a manual training school showed a school district predisposition about competence based upon race. Why else put the
only manual training school in the city in a black area, none in the white
areas, and no college preparatory school in the black area?
Barrett Elementary was also suspect. It had been newly constructed
in a transition area of vanishing white students who in the 1960s had
been attending class at Stedman Elementary on the eastern side of Colorado Boulevard. At Stedman, black students increasingly gathered with
the majority white concentration on that eastern side of the boulevard. As
the black population began to increase to the west of Colorado Boulevard, the white schools to the east were increasingly picking them up and
mixing them with white kids at Stedman. The school district's solution to
this increasing integration in Stedman was to build a new school just to
the west and put the boundary for that new school down the middle of
Colorado Boulevard. That became Barrett Elementary, and when it
opened, its student population was 92% black. Blacks who had been attending integrated Stedman Elementary were forced back into a virtually
all black school.
Bardwell and Klite also had information about who was already being bussed. Black junior high school students were being transported ten
miles from northeast Denver near Stapleton International Airport across
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the northern tier of the city to the west side to Lake Junior High School.
Lake was predominantly Hispanic. The overcrowding in the Stapletonarea junior high school was not, therefore, solved by bussing students to
the nearest junior high school. It was solved by bussing students to the
nearest junior high school with a predominately minority population
As promised, Connery enlisted Gordon Greiner, an experienced litigator of antitrust cases in federal district court. Soon, Greiner, Bardwell,
Klite, and I met in Greiner's office to study school district maps. As the
black population of north Denver had gradually moved east across the
northern tier of the city, school boundaries for elementary schools had
regularly shifted eastward. The effect was that black children who had
moved across boundary lines into white districts could be recaptured by
the new lines and brought back into redrawn black districts. Barrett Elementary was just one example. These boundary changes were effectively
segregating Denver's schools, and this practice had been going on since
the 1920s.
Greiner was conservative by conviction, and my recollection is that
when I was first in meetings with him, he was uncomfortable with any
accusations of racism. It may have seemed to him to be so much liberal
exaggeration. He would not at first allow the conversations to go there.
Nevertheless, he was persuaded to lead our team. He was a cool, steady,
experienced trial lawyer. For the next nine months, Greiner, Bardwell,
Klite, and I were welded at the hip. Klite was a brilliant research physician. Bardwell, the mathematician, could produce the printouts of teacher-student assignments and correlate these with census data. I was a
young lawyer-defector holding on for the ride as co-counsel, about to
participate in the biggest case of my life.
For the next four months, we saw more of each other than we did of
our wives or families, and spent more hours writing, drafting, analyzing
the law and the printouts, going out for sandwiches, and coming back to
the office than we did of any other activity in our lives. Eventually, perhaps in mid-June 1969, the newspapers got wind that a lawsuit against
the school district was in the offing. Greiner was adamant. "Don't try the
case in public," he said. "Save it for court." Reporters were calling. "We
are considering some action," Greiner said. Greiner and I began to draft
sections of the complaint.
In this, and in the research of the cases around the country, we were
greatly aided by a team of volunteer lawyers that included Bob Connery,
Larry Treece, Ed Kahn, and a number of others from some of the best
firms in Denver. As the complaint was being drafted, they fed their analyses to Greiner, who was preparing the lion's share of the legal argument.
One day, probably in early July 1969, Greiner called the school district and asked what would be its deadline if a court were to order it to
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change the boundary lines back and put into effect the boundaries of the
integration resolutions. I do not remember the exact date that the district
told us. The school district definitely, however, gave us the impression
that it would need a court order very soon-my impression was that the
district wanted it very soon, perhaps by July 31. The district pled urgency
because it would take time to arrange bus schedules and teacher assignments.
"OK," Greiner said, "we will be back to you."
Dr. Wilfred Keyes was a quiet, soft-spoken, tall, good-looking black
man, and the father of two children who attended the Denver Public
Schools. To be in his presence was to be calm. He had been interested in
integration, in principle, he said, and was willing to be the lead plaintiff
for the Denver suit. He and his family would stand in for the class of all
Denver's children who were being deprived of an equal educational opportunity. Eventually, he was joined by seven other parents from both
black and Hispanic families. As we were getting acquainted one afternoon in the Holland & Hart conference room, surrounded by law books
and stacks of computer printouts, Dr. Keyes clearly understood that his
role would be controversial. He was willing, he said. The case would be
styled, we told him, Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1.
Dr. Keyes nodded and said softly, "All right."
Just "all right." One had the feeling that here was a person of deep
tenderness and concern, and that he would be willing to help because that
is what concerned people do. At the time, none of us knew how much we
were asking of him or how dangerous it would turn out to be.
We worked through the first weeks of July and had a complaint
drafted by mid-month. One day we filled our briefcases and marched
ceremoniously onto Seventeenth Street and down to the federal courthouse. In the draw of judges, we were assigned William E. Doyle. He
was a democrat, maybe even liberal. It was terrific luck.
The filing hit the front pages. Banner headlines: Eight Denver children and their parents sue the school district for segregation of Denver's
schools based on a pattern of intentional conduct over a period of years
leading to widespread racial discrimination and inequality of educational
opportunity. Plaintiffs claim that they have been denied their rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs are sorely
aggrieved.
So was the rest of Denver. Controversy exploded. At home, my
family started getting our first hate calls, callers in the middle of the
night. Our lives, all of us, and those of the plaintiffs, especially the Keyes
family, had become suddenly public. Two-thirds of the voters of Denver
had voted against the candidates who supported the integration resolutions, and a small minority was about to try to reinstate the integration
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option. It was not right, said the majority. It was what the Constitution
required, said the plaintiffs. It was not what the Constitution required,
and elections should not be upset by the courts, said the majority. All this
debate raged in the offices, on the streets, and on the editorial pages of
Denver's newspapers.
This was high drama and I had, by some happenstance of nature,
landed right in the middle of it. Eventually, I became our spokesperson to
the press. We filed a motion with Judge Doyle requesting an immediate
hearing because the school district itself wanted speed. It had to have an
answer -probably by July 31-so the hearing had to be soon. We asked
for five days of trial. Then we turned to making exhibits, graphs, and
charts showing racial attendance at all of Denver's northeast sector
schools, trends over the years, the census data, and the flows of population across the northern tier of the city. Judge Doyle said that he could
hear the case beginning July 16. The school district's lawyers protested
that that was too soon for them to be prepared. They were probably right.
We had filed a forty-page complaint, together with a few hundred pages
of computer printouts, maps, and color-coded census flow charts. Our
documents were detailed and probably inexplicable without a witness to
explain them, so giving them the exhibits did not tell them very much.
The district appropriately asked for more time.
"You said you had to know soon," said Judge Doyle, setting the trial date.
Two days before trial, Gordy and I worked through the whole night
preparing arguments, lists of questions for witnesses and crossexamination, copies of exhibits, opening argument, and briefs on the law.
Gordy was the primary brief writer; I was his lieutenant.
Gordy was a veteran: tough, disciplined, and experienced in front of
Judge Doyle. We spent that night working through the final documents
and then the next morning left copies for our colleagues to help with the
copying and cataloguing. By this time, we had volunteer lawyers and
friends coming in from all over Denver, helping with every kind of detail. The COC was rallying legal assistance, money for copying, some
legal fees, and hundreds of hours of volunteers in addition to Klite and
Bardwell. The day before trial, the volunteers took over completing the
exhibits, and Greiner and I went home to sleep.
The next morning at 9:00 a.m., we appeared in federal district court.
When Greiner got up to make his opening statement, the courtroom was
jam-packed and hushed. All of Denver was apparently in there, and quiet. Greiner told Judge Doyle:
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This is a class action brought to redress the denial of the equal protection of the laws of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs [are
those] who . . . would have been assigned to integrated schools had
3
Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 . . . been implemented.

Greiner said that the plaintiffs wanted a preliminary injunction that
would mandate reinstating Resolution 1520, 1524, and 1531. Judge
Doyle sat back, skeptical, but listened. He dropped his white head in his
hands and looked at Gordy cautiously, but he let the argument go forward. After about an hour, it became clear he was going to let us go to
our evidence.
It didn't help plaintiffs' cause that all the town was in a rage about
our being there, and Judge Doyle knew that as well as anyone else. He
had a hornet's nest on his hands. He was obviously skeptical, but Greiner
had persuaded him to listen.
Gordy led off with our first witness, Rachel Noel, the stately and
dignified black school board member who had offered Resolution 1490
in May 1968, the resolution that had started the whole sequence of events
pressing toward integration. Her testimony went in very well. Then came
Edgar Benton, himself a former board member and a solid supporter of
school integration. He was my witness. I was on my feet in federal district court for the first time. It must have showed. But Ed did his job, and
we got through that sequence without peril. He spoke to the history of
efforts to move Denver toward integration. Objections from opposing
counsel were not sustained. Next came James Voorhees, also a former
board member and again my witness. I asked him what in his judgment
had been the focus of the school board elections that had led to the defeat
of Benton and Pascoe and the rescission of the resolutions. That's when
the roof fell in.
"Oh brother. Do you object to that question?" asked Judge Doyle.
"Yes, I do your honor, I don't think that this is a proper question of
a lay witness.'
For a seasoned lawyer, this might not have seemed like much. For
me, this was clear evidence that I was new in the courtroom and the humiliation of having the judge make the objection doubled the embarrassment. The matter was of little moment for the trial as a whole. It will
always, however, be a vivid part of my experience of the Keyes case. The
court urging opposing counsel to object to an error that was obvious to
everyone but me.

3. Transcript, vol. 1, at 17, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. C-1499 (D. Colo. July 16, 1969)
(testimony of Gordon Greiner) (on file with Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries).
4. Id at 116.
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Midway through the first day, Greiner examined Dr. Paul Klite on
school attendance records, and in the afternoon I examined Dr. George
Bardwell on census data, attempting to make the correlations between
census data and enrollment records. The graphs and charts of these two
witnesses moved the case off the emotional story and into the facts showing how the school district had changed the boundaries to accord with
black population movements. This solid statistical and census data took
about two days of trial. Klite's charts easily went into evidence. Exhibits
offered; exhibits accepted.
"I think, though," Judge Doyle said to me on the second day while I
was offering the Bardwell census exhibits, "we ought to make an inquiry
about where we are going here. Have you changed your plans? Have you
now decided to throw everything but the kitchen sink into this hearing, or
including the sink?" 5
Without Bardwell's census data, Klite's enrollment information
would prove little. But if enrollment was combined with census data, we
could demonstrate that as soon as blacks moved into previously all-white
census districts, they were pulled back into black schools. Together, the
two kinds of data were complementary. But if Judge Doyle considered
the census to be "the kitchen sink" and denied its admission, we were in
deep trouble. Now he was threatening to do just that.
I told the judge that we needed the past census and corresponding
boundary changes to prove the intention of the rescissions as part of a
long-term pattern of intentional segregation. The explanation was sufficient; the exhibits and testimony were accepted into evidence.
Some weeks before trial, Bardwell had been in the school superintendent's office asking for certain records concerning teacher assignments. The superintendent said, "Sorry, we don't keep those records."
Bardwell, who had been digging around for school records for two
years, said, "Oh, yes, you do, they are right there on that shelf, in the red
book behind you." Sure enough, in that red binder were the records the
superintendent apparently did not even know he had, and Bardwell got
them.
For two days, we kept entering Bardwell's computer printouts and
Klite's enrollment summaries into evidence. Judge Doyle then began
listening more intently. Over the years, every time black children in
Denver had begun to spill over into the districts that were majority white,
somehow the boundaries had been changed with the effect to move the
blacks back into predominantly black, or segregated, districts. In effect,
boundary changes had been used to resegregate. This result was always
5. Transcript, vol. II, at 185-86, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. C-1499 (D. Colo. July 17,
1969) (on file with Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries).
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claimed by the school district to be unintentional or accidental or the
result of housing patterns. But over the years, the boundary changes were
too regular and too consistent for that explanation to be credible. This
school district had not become racially divided by chance.
On July 22, after all the evidence was in, Judge Doyle engaged in a
colloquy with Greiner as to whether he could enter a "mandatory injunction," in effect compelling the district to take some new action. Judge
Doyle said skeptically, "I haven't got the power to do that."
Without missing a beat, Greiner replied, "Oh sure you do." 6 The
plaintiffs were asking, not for a mandatory injunction, but for a return to
the status quo ante, namely the status before rescission. But on that last
day of the hearing, Judge Doyle appeared to be skeptical of our request
for relief.
Judge Doyle ruled orally the next day, July 23, 1969, and had
somehow resolved his doubts. He said that there was credible evidence
of a pattern of discrimination resulting in the division of black and Hispanic children into separate schools and that the situation had intentionally been made worse by the repeal of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 153 1.7
He said that school construction policies, boundary changes, and the use
of mobile units in segregated schools had contributed to this result. He
noted that when majority-white East High School had been substantially
overcrowded, neighboring black Manual High School was left partially
filled. No whites were forced to attend a black school, and he noted that
district boundaries tended to follow the census data, moving in concert
with black migration. He granted the preliminary injunction, requiring
the district to restore the status quo before the rescissions of June 9,
1969. The effect would be a partial integration of Denver's schools beginning September 1, 1969.
It was a stunning victory. The school board lawyers announced immediately that they would appeal. The Tenth Circuit, as everyone knew,
was conservative. It would not likely agree with Judge Doyle. Soon the
circuit court announced that it could not hear the appeal until August 4,
1969. The school district replied that that would be soon enough and that
it could adjust buses and teacher assignments if it were ordered to do so
by that date.
On August 4, during oral argument before three judges on the Tenth
Circuit, one of the judges asked the school's counsel whether Judge
Doyle had considered the impact of the Civil Rights Act. The school
district lawyers said, "No, Judge Doyle did not reference that Act."
6.
Transcript, vol. V, at 746, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. C-1499 (D. Colo. July 22, 1969)
(on file with Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries).
7.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 287-88 (D. Colo. 1969).
8.
Id. at 289.
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"Why not?" someone on the bench asked. Of course, the school district could not tell him and didn't really want to know. Greiner was arguing the case for the plaintiffs. He must have said that the Civil Rights Act
of 1965 did not apply to schools in this situation. I do remember a good
argument to that effect. The three judges of the circuit court were bland,
however, and seemed singularly unimpressed with his argument.
Within hours after the hearing, the Tenth Circuit panel issued an order remanding to Judge Doyle for reconsideration of his decision in light
of the Civil Rights Act of 1965.
It was defeat, equally stunning to the victory of a few days before.
That night, Greiner and I stayed up again, writing all night. The next
morning at about 7:00 a.m., we woke up opposing counsel saying that we
were filing motions immediately with Judge Doyle and that they ought to
be there when court opened. Counsel mumbled some words of cautious
disrespect and said that they should have a right to review our documents
before any hearing. Greiner was not persuaded. At ten o'clock, two days
after the adverse ruling by the Tenth Circuit, we were back in Judge
Doyle's courtroom arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1965 did not apply and that he should not change his decision.
On August 14, Judge Doyle agreed, issuing a new decision, referencing the Civil Rights Act, but saying that it did not apply and did not
change his mind.9 This case was moving forward like a train on a fast
track.
The city waited. Greiner went back to being an antitrust lawyer. I
went to preparing for the next round of the case when we would seek to
make the preliminary injunction permanent, which we expected would
occur sometime during the coming winter. It was now mid-August 1969.
The school district appealed a second time, taking us back to the Tenth
Circuit. This time, the hearing was set for August 22.
"That's OK," said the school district. "If we get a decision by August 22, we can still make it work." The school district counted on the
circuit court as we had come to count on Judge Doyle. Each team had its
own horse. Only theirs was higher up and had more authority than ours
did.
Oral argument was set in the Tenth Circuit for Friday, August 22.
Greiner was consumed by another trial. I would do the argument. I spent
about ten days doing nothing but reading cases about school integration.
I memorized the physical layout and dimensions of a dozen cities in
America where integration had been ordered and where it had not been
ordered. I saw where Denver's case was the same factually, and could
even name the rivers and streets in Kansas City or Charlotte, the applica9.

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 289, 295 (D. Colo. 1969).
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ble law in these decisions, the months, the years, and the abuses. But for
all that, I obviously had never before argued a case of such importance at
such a high level.
On the morning of the argument in the Tenth Circuit, the courtroom
was bursting at the seams. Outside in the halls, there were crowds listening through cracks in the doors, peering through door windows. Under a
strong glare of disbelief from the bench, I argued the difference between
our case and others, and cited the progenitor case of all cases, Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 1),'o with knowledge of just what had gone
on in Kansas City causing the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 to change the
law of the land. I kept my cool as best I could. The three inquisitors
seemed very displeased to see this case again. Judge Murrah was chief
judge. He was gentle, but skeptical. Judge Breitenstein, a clear opponent.
When the argument was over, I was wringing wet. Later, on the streets, I
passed Chief Judge Murrah, wholly by chance. He recognized me. "Nice
argument, counsel," he said as we passed. I smiled, relieved. I got back
to the office and told Greiner what Murrah had said.
"It's a bad sign," he said. "They only compliment you if they are
going to decide against you." Another of the Holland & Hart partners
stopped by the office and told me I had done an excellent job, arguing a
detailed case. For me personally, that was its own small triumph. But the
future did not look bright.
The next day was Friday. Everybody in Denver was waiting for a
decision. There was a rumor going around town that the court had met on
Thursday afternoon right after the argument and had already decided. We
wanted the printed version to come out quickly because in spite of the
case law in our favor, we believed we were in heavy sand before that
tribunal. Furthermore, every day that they delayed made it more difficult
for us to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
We doubted, too, that the Tenth Circuit was neutral. We imagined
that it might even delay as long as possible to make it more difficult to
appeal with time enough to have any effect upon schools opening September 1.
Nothing happened that Friday. Nothing came out Saturday, though
Greiner and I spent the day waiting in the Holland & Hart offices. Sunday, of course, there was no news. There was only one week remaining
before schools were to open.
"That's OK," said the school district's lawyers to the Tenth Circuit.
"If you give us a decision next week, at least by the end of the week, we
still have time to roll back the integration plan." If they knew by August 27, that would do. Schools would open five days later.
10.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Greiner, Ed Kahn, and Bob Connery had begun work on a motion to
file with the United States Supreme Court immediately after the August 4 hearing in the court of appeals. It was entitled, in part, "Motion to
Vacate Suspension of, and to Reinstate an Order of the United States
District Court ... Ordering Partial Implementation of a School Desegregation Plan."" By now plaintiffs' lawyers all thought we might have a
better chance in the Supreme Court than we were having in the Tenth
Circuit. Our reception in that court on August 22, had done nothing to
change that opinion. We would therefore not wait for that court's decision but would prepare our motion to the Supreme Court as if we already
had the Tenth Circuit opinion in hand.
Monday after that August 22, argument in the Tenth Circuit, nothing happened. I remember calling the school district's lawyers. "We are
sending to you our motion that we will file in the United States Supreme
Court." There was silence on the other end of the line.
"How can you do that? You haven't even lost yet," someone said.
"We think we are going to lose, and we don't want you to say to the
Supreme Court that you didn't have notice and a chance to respond. This
gives you notice." Greiner, Kahn, and Connery on that Monday then sent
the motion upon which they had been working to the school district's
lawyers, two days before the Tenth Circuit's decision came down. Connery remembers that the motion went with "a couple hundred" exhibits.
By Tuesday, there was still no word. On Wednesday, Greiner and I
decided to go fishing. If waiting in the office would not help, then maybe
doing something frivolous would. Greiner wanted to go to the western
part of the state over in the Flat Tops, above Glenwood Springs, to a river he knew high up in the wilderness area. I picked him up a little before
dawn, and we drove west and got to the river by about ten o'clock in the
morning. We were out in the middle of nowhere. Gordy caught a bunch
of fish. I did not catch anything. At about dusk, we hiked back to the car,
shucked our rods and gear, and began to load up to head home. I turned
on the car radio. The six o'clock evening news was just starting. The lead
story was that the Tenth Circuit had ruled that Judge Doyle was in error
and had reversed. The schools would not be integrated, after all.
We finished loading the car, and I said I wanted to hurry. I hit the
bends in the dirt road like a madman, skidding around dusty corners,
dragging the rear end until the brakes began to smell, and Gordy said,
"Easy, man, easy." When we got to our first gas station somewhere in the
I1. Motion to Vacate Suspension of, and to Reinstate an Order of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado Ordering Partial Implementation of a School Desegregation Plan,
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215 (1969) [hereinafter Motion] (on file with Norlin Library
Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder, Wilfred Keyes v. Denver School District, Ist Accession, Box 22, Book 2, No. 23A).
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middle of nowhere, we called Bob Connery in Denver. He was on it. He
had been to the Tenth Circuit, obtained the opinion, reviewed it, filled in
the blanks in the pre-prepared motion, had it copied, signed it, called
defendants' counsel, and arranged for our filing to be hand-delivered to
them. By the time we talked to Bob, he was already on his way to the
airport, headed for Washington, D.C. That was Wednesday night at about
nine o'clock. Schools were to open the following Monday.
When we got to Denver at about eleven o'clock that night, I
dropped Greiner at his home and drove to the Holland & Hart office
downtown. At the door, the night watchman looked me over and would
not let me in. I was dirty from the river, scraggly from not shaving, angry
looking, and said that I wanted to go upstairs to get a judicial opinion to
write an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. He looked
skeptical.
"I am a lawyer," I said.
"Sure," said his look.
"Really," I said, "and I have an urgent need to get upstairs and find
out what the court of appeals did to us today. I have to work on it tonight,
all night. I have to hurry."
Eventually, the guard let me in. I went up, found the opinion where
Connery had left it, and took it home. During the night, I wrote a supplement to what Connery, Greiner, and Kahn had already prepared the
week before, now referring to the actual language that Judge Breitenstein
had used. It appeared that Judge Breitenstein had made a critical error
citing the Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) decision of 1955. He
said that integration was supposed to occur "with all convenient speed."l 2
The error was obvious: according to Brown II, integration was to occur
"with all deliberate speed." 3 The difference in tone and intention was
profound.
Bob Connery remembers drafting a supplement to a motion while in
the airport on the way to Washington, D.C. My own recollection is that I
drafted the supplement, or some substantial portion thereof, on a yellow
pad in my home in the early hours of Thursday morning.14 Thus the recollections of two close friends differ on this one.15 At some time during
12.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215, 1216-17 (1969) (emphasis added) ("It was not
correct to justify the stay on the ground that constitutional principles demanded only that desegregation be accomplished with all convenient speed. 'The time for mere "deliberate speed" has run
out .... " (quoting Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
13.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (emphasis added).
14. Motion, supra note 11.
15.
The pleading bears my name at the top of the list of signatories, and this is the only pleading of that summer where this is the case. In addition, much of the language is in my characteristically more dramatic style. So there is a fair chance that I am right about this one, but of course Bob's
memory should be trusted too. We will perhaps not ever know the accurate account.
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that Thursday morning, I called Connery. He had located a law office in
Washington, D.C., that would provide administrative help. I read to him
language for the supplement from my yellow pad. Whether it was substantial language or a few additions, we may not ever know. Whoever
wrote it, the style was truncated, terse, and to the point:
[The Tenth Circuit] reverses the trial court and does so without finding or stating any errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of law.
No contrary finding of fact is suggested. No injury to opposing parties is cited..

.

. The fundamental rights of Negro children are being

denied in the interest of the vague, unidentified and uncertain com6
munity sentiment. 1
I packed a bag and went to the airport.
Friday morning, Connery and I sat in the lawyers' lounge of the Supreme Court. Connery had been told that the case had been referred-to
Justice White, who was the Justice for our circuit, but that by happenstance Justice White was out of town and the case had been passed over
to Justice Brennan. We waited in the lounge in case the Justices might
want anything from us. Schools were to open in three days. We could not
go through the usual long appeals. A circuit court, we said, was ordering
the resegregation of Denver's schools. Ordering resegregation was worse
than just letting it flow on unabated.
Eventually, the school district's lawyers arrived. They were unhappy. They had had to get up at an ungodly hour, write a response brief
within minutes, get on the plane, and bring it to Washington, D.C., in a
highly irregular and unprecedented procedure. They looked sleepless and
disgruntled. Connery and I sat under a portrait of Chief Justice Hughes.
Our opponents sat under portraits of Justice Field and Chief Justice Jay.
Every half hour, a tour guide led a crowd of tourists through the room,
speaking in hushed tones. "This is the lawyers' lounge," whispered the
guide, "and these are lawyers waiting upon the pleasure of the Court."
Bob and I sat up and straightened our ties.
At about 11:00 a.m., a messenger from the clerk of the Court came
to us and said that Justice Brennan was writing an opinion. He would not
say what the gist of the decision was. He asked that if we go out for
lunch, we tell the clerk's office where we would be and suggested that
we not be gone for long. We said we would not go far and would come
back soon. A Supreme Court-experienced lawyer from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund flew in from New York City to be with us. If the Court
wanted to talk to us, he would give us stature and wisdom. We three
went to lunch in one of Washington's oak-paneled restaurants that
smelled of 1776 and Thomas Jefferson. We hurried back.
16.

Motion, supranote 11.
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A clerk's assistant came into the lawyers' lounge again and said that
an opinion would be released at 3:00 p.m. Channel 4 news from Denver
came to interview us on the courthouse steps, gleaming marble columns
all behind. Then came Channel 7: "What decision did we expect?" We
said we did not have any idea. "There have, however, been decades of
discrimination, even in the North," we said, giving away a little gratuitous propaganda.
Then the television news stations interviewed the lawyers for the
district. "This is egregious," they said. "There is too little time now to
change the schools back to the integration mode. We have already made
up the new assignments and lists for the opening on Monday."
Both sides sulked back to the lawyers' lounge. It was hot in there.
Our shirts were soaking. Tour groups kept coming through. "This is the
lawyers' lounge, and these are lawyers waiting upon the pleasure of the
Court."
At three o'clock sharp, a messenger from the clerk's office came to
the door. "The decision is ready," he said. Bob and I were nearest the
door and quickly out into the marble hallway. We marched 200 feet
down the echoing corridors, the sounds of our leather heels reverberating
off the stone. In the clerk's office on an oak desk was a pile of clean,
white printed materials. "Here," said the clerk's assistant.
Connery reached down, picked up a copy of the opinion, and we
stood without breathing, reading together. Connery read faster and suddenly screamed and jumped-highly inappropriate behavior. Justice
Brennan had corrected Judge Breitenstein's error about convenient
speed.17 The Justice ordered on behalf of the Supreme Court of the United States that Denver's schools open on the following Monday, integrated according to the provisions of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531.8
Bob and I rushed out of the clerk's office and raced to the basement
of the Supreme Court for the phones. We called Greiner, "We won!"
He already knew. The television channels in Denver were all already reporting the news.
Denver's schools would open, for that year, integrated. When we
came off the plane at Stapleton International Airport in Denver, there
was a crowd of people waiting and cheering. We marched down the
gangway like revolutionaries from the barricades and went to someone's
home in the mountains to sing and dance. We were joined by a large
crowd of integration supporters who had been with the cause from the
17. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215, 1216 (1969) ("It was not correct to justify
the stay on the ground that constitutional principles demanded only 'that desegregation be accomplished with all convenient speed."' (quoting Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964))).
18.
Id. at 1217.
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very beginning. The phone rang about twelve o'clock midnight. Half of
Denver was horrified by what we had done. Lawyers for the school district were on the line. They would be askiig the circuit court the next
morning, Saturday, to amend Judge Breitenstein's opinion that had simply been too hastily drafted, speaking to "convenient speed" rather than
"deliberate speed." They would ask the circuit court to correct Judge
Breitenstein's wording error to comply with Justice Brennan's opinion.
They hung up. We drove home, now depressed. The next morning
at 7:00 a.m., I went to the Holland & Hart office and, finding the school
district's midnight motion, began to type a response. For some reason,
the office was almost empty. No secretaries were in the building. I corrected my typing errors with whiteout fluid. Spacing for the headings
was messy. I wrote that the school district should not ask the Tenth Circuit to, in effect, overrule the Supreme Court of the United States. I filed
my reply to the school district's midnight motion in the circuit court of
appeals at about 1:00 p.m. There were no crowds anymore, no more
cheering. If my whited-out, poorly typed response brief would take
enough time to read, it might discourage the judges from quick action.
Then it would be Sunday and too late. No one would work on Sunday.
The school district may have been betting that it could get an angry
Judge Breitenstein to summon the rest of the court's panel on a Saturday
afternoon and in effect, persuade them to maneuver around Justice Brennan's mandate. It was a gutsy call. I was banking on the hope that Judge
Breitenstein's colleagues would lose their appetite. Greiner was so sure
that Judge Breitenstein would not rouse the rest of the panel that he did
not even come to town.
Greiner was right. The last gambit, the midnight appeal, did not
work. On Monday morning, the Tenth Circuit issued an opinion denying
the school district's last motion, saying that things were too far down the
road and that it would be disruptive to the schools to change the plans on
the last weekend before their opening. The Tenth Circuit did not concede
anything to Justice Brennan on the law or acknowledge that it was bound
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Instead, it focused on administrative inconvenience and backed away.
"[A] major city outside the South"l 9 had finally found a hearing the
highest court of the land, and one Justice had taken time to read briefs
that had been hastily drafted and even more hastily submitted, had considered them in spite of their rough form, and found merit.
III. THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS: 1970

That Monday in September 1969, according to the ruling of Justice
Brennan, schools opened integrated under the directions of Resolu19.

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,217 (1973).

1078

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 90:5

tions 1520, 1524, and 1531. Justice Brennan's ruling, however, only enforced a preliminary injunction. Trial for a permanent injunction, or as
we said, "on the merits," would take place in February 1970, and last for
three weeks. I will not recount the full experience of that January trial.
The evidence was much the same as that presented in the summer, but
vastly expanded. This time, the evidence went in smoothly and plaintiffs'
lawyers were optimistic.
Midway through the trial, Wilfred Keyes's front door was dynamited. Dr. Keyes and his family were not hurt, but the event was shocking
and frightening for all involved in the case. Then one night in the middle
of trial, approximately twenty-seven of the district's school buses were
blown up. Someone had laid dynamite cord under the hoods, running
from one bus to the next until all those buses went up in flames. Again,
no one was hurt, but the psychological effect upon those of us trying the
case was serious. We realized for the first time that we could win in court
and be stymied by a resistant population. Without buses, the integration
resolutions would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. After that
explosive evening, it was hard for any of us trying the case to feel optimistic.
I began to receive hate calls in the middle of the night, a practice
that continued for nine years. Usually at about 2:00 a.m., some angry
man would call up and say, "Get up! Time to put your little blond daughter on a bus and send her to school with all those niggers," and then hang
up. One evening during the trial, I looked out my bedroom window and
saw a black car slowly pausing in front of my house, as if casing the
place. Wilfred Keyes's house was made of brick and did not bum up
when he was bombed. My house was of wood and would certainly bum
up if we too were bombed. I had four young children and a wife inside.
After that, we were nervous, and friends from the COC ordered police
protection for our home. Such was the nature of these times.
In February 1970, at the end of a three-week trial on the merits,
Judge Doyle again ruled for plaintiffs. As the case was winding its way
to the Supreme Court, I appeared one last time to argue motions in the
Tenth Circuit. Later that year, more experienced counsel took over. It
was they who took the case to the Supreme Court and won there in 1973.
I did not ever return to the Graduate School of International Studies
at the University of Denver. In May 1970, however, following the Keyes
trial, I announced my candidacy for U.S. Congress in the first congressional district of Colorado (Denver), contesting the seat then held by a
twenty-year Democratic incumbent, Byron Rogers. The Rogers campaign did not make my participation in Keyes an issue, and in September 1970, I won the Democratic primary, topping Rogers by thirty-one
votes. Rogers contested this slim result in the Colorado Supreme Court,
which refused jurisdiction and referred the case to the U.S. Congress. A
committee in Congress confirmed my victory in early October 1970.
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Two weeks later and two weeks before the general election, polls showed
that I enjoyed a fifteen-point lead in the race against my Republican opponent, Mike McKevitt.
The McKevitt campaign now began running full-page advertisements in the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News featuring a facsimile of my signature on the complaint in Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1.
Over the next two weeks, a sustained repetition of these advertisements
turned the tide; my fifteen-point lead evaporated, and in the November
general election, I was defeated by roughly 10,000 votes. I did not return
to politics, as I had not returned to the University of Denver, but continued to practice law for another twelve years.
Two years later, District Attorney Dale Tooley ran for mayor of
Denver. He too led in that race until his opponent began to run full-page
advertisements that proclaimed: "Republicans! Defeat the TooleyBarnes bunch again!" Although Tooley had not been active in the trial of
Keyes, he was portrayed as linked to me as counsel for the Keyes plaintiffs, and Keyes had become a metaphor for "forced, massed, cross-town
bussing," a highly inflammatory phrase widely used by opponents of
school integration. Tooley was also defeated. The Keyes case had that
one more gigantic effect upon the City of Denver.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Forty years after the Supreme Court's decision, Denver's schools
are reported to have been largely resegregated. 20 When measured, therefore, in terms of long-term school integration, the Keyes victory may not
have succeeded. The early successes appear to have been substantially
vitiated by white flight. Further, when measured in terms of educational
improvement, the contest over whether racial integration succeeds in
raising achievement levels may also be contested. My own children
eventually attended East High School in Denver and even though the
school had been "integrated" in terms of the overall student population,
classes at East High tended to gather students along racial lines with
higher numbers of Anglos and Asians attending college preparatory classes, while blacks and Hispanics attended these classes in much fewer
numbers. Whether this was a result of some continued invidious discrimination or a natural tendency of cultures to socialize together, it cannot be
said that Keyes solved this problem.
There was, however, a victory of a different kind that may be less
apparent to observers as the passions of 1968-1969 recede from
memory. The country was in turmoil. Several cities had literally gone up
in flames. From the standpoint of civic institutions, the Keyes case was
20.
See CATHERINE L. HORN & MICHAL KURLAENDER, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE END OF
KEYES-RESEGREGATION TRENDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (2006).
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therefore a win for an alternative approach, and it was ultimately a win
for the philosophy of the country's Founders. When the first Congress of
the United States met in the summer of 1789, James Madison, who had
been a primary architect of the founding document, introduced amendments. These would guarantee specific rights protecting dissent and minority opinion. Letters of the time demonstrate that Madison and Thomas
Jefferson agreed that there was still a need to give the courts a basis for
protection against the worrisome prospect of a tyranny of the majority. 21
It is from this perspective that Keyes and the Denver experience
were a triumph. Racial tension has been a cauldron of dissent and disorder throughout American history. It is from that cauldron that the bombing of the Denver school buses and Dr. Keyes's house erupted. It is that
deep anger that provoked hate calls that came to my house in the middle
of the night for nine years after my participation in the case. As with
much of America, Denver was deeply divided, emblematic of the struggle since the drafting of the Constitution itself. But one thing is clear:
when this deep division is addressed violently, as in lynchings, race riots,
and in the Civil War, the horror of violence drives the chasm between
races even deeper.
The triumph of the Keyes case may not therefore ultimately have
been in educational achievement or integration. It may have been even
more significant that the Keyes litigation was an alternative to the riots of
Los Angeles and Detroit and Washington, D.C. It was a nonviolent response from a people deeply and horribly damaged by the murders of
Martin Luther King Jr. and many others. And it is perhaps here, as a part
of history's centuries-long struggle to foster civil society, that this case is
of significance. If we trace the rule of law back to the Magna Carta of
1215, it will be remembered that on that June day, the aggrieved barons
were assembled in force and numbers outside the king's castle. The alternative to John's assent to the Great Charter was continued civil war.
The signing of the Charter with its provision for councils of deliberation
was simply an alternative to dispute resolution through combat. In that
sense, democracy arose from the collective decision of those assembled
to replace violence with process. By definition, and from its earliest origins, the rule of law is the choice of nonviolence over violence. When
Rachel Noel and her followers chose to go to the courts and not to the
barricades, that was a triumph for democracy.

21.
Madison thought, according to Pauline Maier, that
the greatest danger lay "in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the
minority." Although a "paper barrier" was notoriously ineffective against "the power of
the community," insofar as a bill of rights commanded respect and favor it could "be one
means to control the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined."
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,

1787-1788, at 451

(2010) (footnotes omitted) (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 458 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
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Looking toward the future, in the long run, the greatest danger to
popular government may not even be poor education, though that is certainly a huge challenge. Of even more danger, however, may be the collective despair of a whole racial community. The Keyes case was an antidote to that despair. It gave hope for the pursuit of a dream beyond
Martin Luther King Jr., and in a moment when the rest of the country
was in flames, with Denver very close to it, a legal process was available,
just as James Madison had foreseen it must be. It was available and it
responded.

